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Recent philosophical scholarship tends to cast Zhuangzi’s 
philosophy as promoting moral relativism. This is especially 
true with Chad Hansen’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s 
writings. This article seeks to challenge this dominant 
relativist reading by showing that such a reading does not 
align with the numerous normative and evaluative remarks 
that can be found in Zhuangzi’s work. Furthermore, this 
article aims to show that it is more plausible that Zhuangzi’s 
metaethical view is that of moral realism instead of moral 
relativism. This is because a moral realist interpretation of  
Zhuangzi’s philosophy fits more, not only with the aforesaid  
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which was submitted as a requirement for graduation in his Master of Arts 
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evaluative and normative remarks of Zhuangzi’s writings, 
but also with the mystical elements found in the same 
writings. 
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ecent philosophical scholarship on Zhuangzi has 
portrayed him as espousing moral relativism. This is 
especially true of Chad Hansen’s interpretation of Zhuangzi 
in his works A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought and “Guru or 
Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi.” 2  In the 
latter work, Hansen claims that his relativist interpretation has 
changed the paradigm of philosophical scholarship on 
Zhuangzi’s writings, such that “Today, it is more common for 
a work on Zhuangzi to discuss skepticism or relativism than 
mysticism.”3 In this article, I argue that, despite this paradigm 
shift, moral realism—the opposite of moral relativism—can 
still be a viable label for Zhuangzi’s metaethical view. 
Specifically, I believe that it is more plausible to ascribe moral 
realism to Zhuangzi’s writings, because it avoids interpretive  
 
 
2 Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Chad Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic? 
Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi,” in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven 
Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2003), 128–62. 
3 Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic?,” 128. 
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difficulties that the moral relativist view faces. It also takes 
into serious consideration the mystical elements of said 
writings. In light of this then, my article shall proceed as 
follows: Beginning with a description of the moral relativist 
view of Zhuangzi’s writings as exemplified by Hansen’s work, 
it will then point out the interpretive difficulties that this view 
runs into. Following this, the article will discuss the mystical 
elements of Zhuangzi’s writings concluding with an 
explanation of how Zhuangzi’s mysticism makes it more 
likely that Zhuangzi’s metaethics is moral realist. 
Zhuangzi as a Moral Relativist 
The gist of the moral relativist interpretation of Zhuangzi 
can be stated as follows: For Zhuangzi, all daos or “ways” are 
equally good since there is no superior (moral) viewpoint by 
which to judge them. Now, what exactly is a dao? For 
Hansen, daos are “wholesale guiding structures that include 
ways of describing and categorizing things for action. The 
norms of meaning and epistemic norms are included along 
with those of ethics. All such norms make up our 
comprehensive view or a ‘form of life.’4 In short, a dao can be 
considered as one’s “point of view.” This point of view in 
turn is the corollary of one’s particular upbringing or the 
circumstances of one’s life.  
 
4 Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic?,” 134. 




Hansen reads Zhuangzi as believing that one cannot use 
the dao that one adheres to, in order to judge an alternative 
dao. The very standards of evaluation that a person follows is 
part of that person’s dao and so is incommensurable with 
another dao.5 A very simple example of this would be two 
people facing each other. Since they are at different locations, 
they will literally have different views. For instance, the tree 
that is on the right for one of them will be on the left for the 
other—strictly speaking there is no way to reconcile these 
opposing views. Thus for Hansen’s Zhuangzi, evaluating one 
dao by way of another is an exercise in futility. It merely 
shows the failure of people to understand that they follow 
ultimately different daos. A point arguably supported by 
Zhuangzi’s own comment on the perennial debates between 
the Confucian and Mohist philosophers. Zhuangzi says:  
And so we have the “That’s it, That’s not” of the 
Confucians and Mohists, by which what is it for 
one of them for the other is not, what is not for 
one of them for the other is. If you wish to 
affirm what they deny and deny what they 
affirm, the best means is Illumination.6 
Indeed, for Hansen, the “illumination” that Zhuangzi talks 
about is precisely the realization that people have different 
 
5 Hansen, A Daoist Theory, 275–76. 
6 Zhuangzi, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, trans. Angus Graham, 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001), 52. 




(and irreconcilable) points of views or daos based on their 
unique circumstance or “position” in life.7 
Neither can there be an appeal to a supreme, objective, 
moral point of view such as nature or Heaven (Tian天). For 
Zhuangzi, as Hansen reads him, nature or Heaven is merely 
the totality of all things. It does not serve as a normative 
ground. It merely gives birth to all beings, including all daos, 
but is biased towards none of them.8 Appealing to nature or 
Heaven though is precisely what certain contemporaries of 
Zhuangzi have tried to do in legitimizing their moral 
philosophies. Mencius for instance attempts to legitimize the 
Confucian dao, or way of life, over its rivals by postulating 
that the Confucian virtues are but the inevitable development 
of the natural feelings of the human heart-mind (xin 心)9, 
which in turn were placed there by Heaven.10  By showing 
that all human daos are natural and that nature itself does not 
serve as a ground for normativity, Zhuangzi thus disabuses 
thinkers like Mencius of their confidence in the normative 
supremacy of their respective dao.  
 
7 Hansen, A Daoist Theory, 281. 
8 This is what Hansen understands to be the message of the story about 
the pipes of heaven, earth, and man, found in the second chapter of the 
Zhuangzi. See: Hansen, A Daoist Theory, 274–75. 
9 Xin although strictly representing the heart is translated in philosophical 
literature often as “heart-mind” because in Classical Chinese Philosophy it is 
generally considered as the seat of both the cognitive and affective faculties of 
the human being. See: John Berthrong, “Xin (Hsin): Heart and Mind,” in 
Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Antonio Cua (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 
795. 
10 Hansen, A Daoist Theory, 277. 




The above is a summary of the moral relativist 
interpretation of Zhuangzi. However, this interpretation 
runs into some difficulties because of how Zhuangzi’s 
writings themselves fail to square with it. That is to say, if  
Zhuangzi is advocating the idea that all daos are equally 
legitimate, and that there is no ultimate standard by which to 
evaluate their normative value relative to one another, then 
it would seem difficult to account for certain (strong) 
evaluative and normative statements that he himself writes 
about. For instance, there are areas in Zhuangzi’s writings 
where he seems to be clearly pointing to a way of life that is 
superior to all others, and in pointing this out, he 
concomitantly gives a negative evaluation of the way of life 
of people in general. An example is the anecdote near the 
end of the chapter “Equalizing Assessment of Things.” 
Through the character of Zhang Wuzi, Zhuangzi tries to 
show how the sage is distinct from the rest of the masses. 
He says: 
Those who dream of drinking wine cry and sob at 
daybreak, while those who dream of crying and 
sobbing go to work the fields and hunt at 
daybreak. Being situated in their dreams, they do 
not know of their dreaming. In the midst of 
dreaming they even interpret a dream, awaken 
and afterward know of their dreaming. Moreover, 
there will be a great awakening and afterward they 
will know of this [life’s] being a great dream; but  
 




the misguided consider themselves to be awake, 
knowing this presumptuously. A lord! A 
herdsmen! Such certainty! Confucius and you—
both of you are dreaming. I am saying you are 
dreaming— even this is a dream. This is known 
by the name of the Great Deception. Ten 
thousand generations pass and at once meet with 
a great sage that can unravel it; this will be a brief 
encounter with him.11 
As Wayne Gary Kreger says, the basic message of this 
passage seems to be that the people suffer from a kind of 
ignorance of the true state of reality—metaphorically spoken 
of as a dream—and that only the sage is free from such 
ignorance.12 
A more individual example of Zhuangzi criticizing a dao 
is when he scolds his friend Huizi who was considered a 
member of the “School of Names” or terminologists. 13 
Zhuangzi believed Huizi to be too immersed in logical hair-
splitting to enjoy the ideal kind of life. As Zhuangzi says:  
Now you [i.e., Huizi], on the other hand, treat 
your spirit like a stranger and labor your vitality,  
 
 
11 Wayne Gary Kreger, “The Experience of Knowing: Illusion and Illumination 
in the Zhuangzi and the Platform Sūtra,” (Master’s Thesis, University of 
British Columbia, 2010), 19–20. 
12 Ibid., 19–21. 
13 See: Fung Yu-Lan,  A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: The 
Free Press, 1997), 83–87. 




leaning against a door screen reciting your 
disputations or nodding off across your desk. 
Heaven chose your physical form, and here you 
are using it to crow on about “hardness” and 
“whiteness!”14 
Zhuangzi is also known to criticize Confucius himself and 
his way of life as in the chapter “Markers of Full Virtuosity,” 
where the character Toeless gives a negative evaluation of 
Confucius:  
Toeless told Old Dan, “As an aspirant to be a 
perfected being, Confucius is not quite there. 
Why does he pretend to have a train of disciples? 
He seems to be seeking something fantastic and 
strange like a good name. Doesn’t he understand 
that the perfected being considers it like 
handcuffs and shackles?15 
From this it seems clear that the message Zhuangzi is trying to 
relay is that acting out of a desire for a good name is 
normatively worse than otherwise. And so, there are certain  
 
 
14 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional 
Commentaries, trans. Brook Ziporyn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
Inc., 2009), 38. With regards to “hardness” and “whiteness” Ziporyn says that 
“their relationship to specific white and hard beings, and to what degree they 
can exist in separation from one another, were among the topics hotly debated 
by the ancient Chinese logicians, including Huizi.” See: Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, 38, 
n.18. 
15 Jung Lee, The Ethical Foundations of Early Daoism: Zhuangzi’s Unique Moral 
Vision (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 21. 




“forms of life” or daos that can be worse than others. It should 
also be noted that in this story Confucius is further described 
by Toeless as punished by Heaven,16 conveying that Zhuangzi 
did not consider Heaven or nature as normatively neutral. 
Finally, aside from negatively evaluating certain ways of 
life or actions, Zhuangzi gives positive evaluations or 
portrayals of what appear to be ideal lifestyles. An example 
would be Zhuangzi’s description of the Genuine Human 
Being in the chapter “The Great Source as Teacher”: 
The Genuine Human Beings of old slept without 
dreaming and awoke without worries. Their food 
was plain but their breathing was deep. The 
Genuine Human Beings breathed from their 
heels, while the mass of men breathed from their 
throats. Submissive and defeated they gulp down 
their words and just as soon vomit them back 
up. Their preferences and desires run deep, but 
the Heavenly Impulse is shallow in them.17 
Here, Genuine Human Beings are contrasted with the 
majority of humanity and it is implied that the former live 
more ideal lives than the latter. This is further supported by 
the fact that this passage that I quote is only a part of a 
lengthier description of the Genuine Human Being, which  
 
 
16 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, 36. 
17 Ibid., 40. 




seeks to show and praise his ideal state.18 Thus by contrasting 
the masses of men with the Genuine Human Being in this 
aforementioned description, it is implied that these masses 
of men live precisely un-ideal states. 
I believe that these examples are sufficient to portray that 
Zhuangzi’s writings do not express the idea that all daos are 
ultimately of equal normative value. Rather, there seems to 
be a certain way of life which Zhuangzi, with categorical 
conviction it seems, considers as “better” than others. In 
order to have an idea as to what this ideal way of life is, it is 
necessary to look into the mystical elements of Zhuangzi’s 
writings. 
Zhuangzi’s Mysticism 
In order to see whether there are mystical elements in 
Zhuangzi’s writings, a definition of “mysticism” is first 
required. In agreement with Thomas McConochie, I shall 
adopt Steven Katz’s definition of mysticism from the latter’s 
book Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources.19 
This definition states that “Mysticism is the quest for the 
direct experience of God, Being, or Ultimate Reality, 
however these are understood, that is, theistically or non-
theistically.”20  For our purposes, this definition can further 
 
18 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, 39–42. 
19 Thomas McConochie, “Mysticism in the Zhuangzi,” (PhD Diss., University 
of New South Wales, 2017), 48. 
20  Steven Katz, ed., Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. 




be divided into two parts, namely, “the quest for direct 
experience,” and “God, Being, or Ultimate Reality.”  
Let us look at the latter part first. Is there anything in 
Zhuangzi’s writings that seem to fit the description of god, 
being, or ultimate reality? I believe that “dao” itself is, for 
Zhuangzi, something that can arguably be considered as 
ultimate reality. What does it mean, however, for something 
to be ultimate reality? Wesley Wildman provides a most 
basic definition of ultimate reality, as that which all 
determinate reality ontologically depends on as its 
“whence.” 21  Although Wildman does not explain more 
explicitly what “whence” means, it can be inferred from the 
few things that he says about it, that it simply signifies that 
which determinate reality is, in the final case, ontologically 
dependent on.22 From this definition, other descriptions of 
the ultimate reality can be deduced.  
The first definition is that ultimate reality, as that which 
all other realities depend on, cannot itself have ontological 
dependencies on anything else; indeed, as Wildman says, 
ultimate reality would not be ultimate, if it did.23 A corollary 
of this is that ultimate reality is of a categorically different  
 
 
21 Wesley Wildman, “Really Ultimate Reality,” Theology and Science 15, no. 3 
(2017): 261, accessed November 25, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
14746700.2017.1335061. 
22  Wildman though does say that the term “whence” is something he 
borrowed from Friedrich Schleiermacher, but he does not explain more. See: 
Wildman, “Really Ultimate Reality,” 262. 
23 Wildman, “Really Ultimate Reality,” 262. 




kind than the determinate realities that depend on it. As 
Wildman says, ultimate reality is not a being similar to any 
other kind of being, “because otherwise it would be subject 
to the structures and dynamics of being.”24 Being subject to 
the structures and dynamics of being would mean that 
ultimate reality would somehow be conditioned by, and 
depend on, these aforesaid structures and dynamics for its 
own existence. This, again, would prevent it from being the 
ultimate reality. Wildman’s description of ultimate reality can 
be understood as one which indicates its “transcendent” 
aspect, since it precisely brings to light how ultimate reality 
transcends, or is beyond the nature of, its non-ultimate 
counterpart(s). 
In Zhuangzi’s writings, dao is described with this similar 
sense of transcendence over beings. Specifically, in the 
chapter, “The Great Source as Teacher,” dao is said to have: 
Its own tendency and consistency, but without 
any deliberate activity or definite form. . . . Being 
its own roots and its own foundation, it exists 
firmly even when heaven and earth are not yet 
there. It makes the spirits and the Lord-on-High 
divine, generates both heaven and earth. It is 
above the summit without being high, beneath 
the nadir without being deep. It precedes heaven 
 
24 Wildman, “Really Ultimate Reality,” 262. 




and earth without being of long duration. It is 
elder to the earliest antiquity without being old.25 
Here, dao is described as that which antedates and 
generates “heaven and earth.” It should be noted that the 
compound word tiandi, translated as the phrase “heaven and 
earth,” does not mean Heaven as the supreme deity or 
power, but rather, the entirety of the visible world.26 Dao is 
also said to be that which made the spirits and the Lord-on 
High,27 divine. It is dao that made them what they are. Thus, 
dao might be understood as that which all beings, visible 
and invisible, depend on for their existence. Conversely, dao 
itself is described as being its own root and foundation, 
which implies that it is not dependent on anything else for 
its existence. Finally, that dao is described as having no 
form, as well as paradoxically being above the summit 
without being high, being beneath the nadir without being 
deep, and being elder to the eldest antiquity without being 
ancient, arguably indicates that dao is not conditioned and 
limited by the structures and dynamics of beings, particularly 
the spatio-temporal dimensions of which phenomenal 
beings consist. 
 
25 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, 43–44. 
26 Eske Møllgaard, An Introduction to Daoist Thought: Action, Language, and Ethics 
in Zhuangzi (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 6. 
27 The god of the Shang dynasty, which was appropriated by the Zhou 
dynasty and conflated with their own god, Heaven. See: Confucius, Analects: 
With Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. Edward Slingerland (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2003), xviii. 




However, ultimate reality is not merely understood as 
transcendent to its non-ultimate, but also immanent in it. 
Indeed, immanence and transcendence unavoidably go 
together as mutually determinative characteristics of ultimate 
reality.28 As Chin Tai-Kim explains: 
Both transcendence and immanence are 
relational notions that relate the ground to the 
grounded beings. If the unconditioned ground 
is interpreted to be ontologically transcendent 
to the grounded beings, there arises a task of 
explicating their relationship that overcomes 
their chorismos [i.e., separation]. The region of 
such relationship is the region of the ground’s 
immanence in the grounded beings. If, on the 
other hand, the unconditioned ground is 
interpreted to be ontologically immanent in the 
grounded beings, their relationship is secured, 
but the unconditioned status of the ground 
must be restored. A suitable notion of 
transcendence must be re-introduced top reserve 
the ontological dignity of the unconditioned 
ground. Transcendence and immanence thus defy 
 
28 Chin Tai-Kim, “Transcendence and Immanence,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 55, no. 3 (Autumn 1987): 537, accessed September 10, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1464069.  




separation; they exist in a tension in any reflective 
conception of ultimate reality.29 
Is there however any indication, then of dao’s immanence in 
Zhuangzi’s writings? In chapter two of the Zhuangzi, 
Zhuangzi appears to state the omnipresence of dao in a brief 
rhetorical question: “Wherever we walk, how can the Way 
[i.e., dao] be absent?”30 
Perhaps a better indication of dao’s immanence can be 
found in the lines immediately succeeding the above cited 
description of dao, in the chapter “The Great Source as 
Teacher.”  
Xiwei got it [i.e., dao] and thereby put the 
measure around heaven and earth. Fuxi got it 
and thereby inherited the matrix of vital energy. 
The Big Dipper got it and thereby has remained 
undeflected since antiquity. The sun and moon 
got it and thereby have continued without 
ceasing since antiquity. Kanpi got it and thereby 
inherited the power of Mt. Kunlun. Pingyi got it 
and thereby roams the great rivers. Jien Wu got it 
and thereby dwells on the heights of Mt. Tai. 
The Yellow Emperor got it and ascended the 
clouds of Heaven. ZhuanXu got it and thereby 
occupies the Dark Palace. Yu Qiang got it and 
 
29 Chin Tai Kim, “Transcendence and Immanence,” 145–146. 
30 Zhuangzi, Chuang-Tzu, 52. 




thereby took his place at the Northern 
Extremity. The Queen Mother of the West got it 
and thereby took her seat on Mt. Shaoguang—
no one knows her beginning or her end. Pengzu 
got it and thereby remained alive all the way back 
from the time of Shun Youyu down to the time 
of the Five Tyrants. Fu Yue got it and thereby 
ministered to Wuding, who took possession of 
the world, rode upon the Dong-wei galaxy, 
mounted upon the Qiwei constellation, and 
assumed his place arrayed among the stars.31 
Dao in this passage is described as being attained by various 
entities. By attaining dao, these entities were able to achieve 
what they were “meant to do or be.” For instance, the Big 
Dipper attained dao and therefore remained undeflected—it 
never swerved from its course in the sky. The sun and moon 
also attained dao and from then on have also remained 
constant in their movement in the heavens. Likewise, 
Pengzu, who is known in Chinese folklore as an 
extraordinarily aged person, attained dao, and was able 
precisely to live for such a long time. At any rate, this 
passage merely shows that dao exists immanently in the 
world through these beings that receive it. 
There are other places in Zhuangzi’s writings that can 
substantiate the idea that dao is immanent in phenomenal  
 
 
31 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, 44. 




reality. For instance, McConochie cites the character 
Xuyou’s description of his teacher 32  which appears to 
describe the all-encompassing (and therefore immanent) 
nature of dao. The context of Xuyou’s story is this: Yierzi 
went to see Xuyou and the former described to him how the 
Sage-King Yao taught him (Yierzi) to devote himself to 
benevolence and righteousness. Xuyou scoffs at Yierzi 
saying that Yao’s teaching will make sure that he will no 
longer be able to “wander along the free and unrestrained 
path.”33 Xuyou then gives a description of his own teacher: 
“My teacher! My teacher! My teacher chops up the myriad 
things, yet is not righteous. My teacher blesses all people, yet 
are [sic] not humane. My teacher is older than antiquity, yet 
is not ancient. My teacher covers Heaven and bear [sic] up 
Earth, and carves up all forms, but is not skillful [sic].”34 
According to McConochie, the teacher described here is not 
any human being, but dao.35 This can be inferred from the 
descriptions given to Xuyou’s teacher such as being older 
than antiquity yet not being ancient. This echoes the 
description above of dao as being elder to the eldest 




32 McConochie, “Mysticism in the Zhuangzi,” 260. The character Xuyou is 
also found in the chapter “The Great Source as Teacher” See: Zhuangzi, 
Zhuangzi, 48–49. 
33 McConochie, “Mysticism in the Zhuangzi,” 260. 
34 Ibid., 261. 
35 Ibid., 263. 




“carves up all forms” can be understood as his teacher being 
what gives things their shape, that is to say, what produces 
them. However, more importantly, Xuyou’s teacher is 
described as covering heaven and bearing up the earth. As 
McConochie implies, this imagery gives the sense that 
Xuyou’s teacher encompasses or pervades all things.36 This 
then indicates the immanence of dao in the world.  
Finally, according to McConochie, the notion that dao is 
encompassing is also seen in a description of it from chapter 
two of the Zhuangzi, “Equalizing Assessments of Things.” 
McConochie calls this description as “Dao Pervades and 
Unifies,” and I cite here part of his translation of it: 
If we take stalks and pillars, the ugly and the 
beautiful, the strange and the grotesque, dao (道) 
pervades (tong 通) them and makes them into 
one. Their division is their completion. Their 
completion is their ruin. Hence, all things are 
without [total] completion or ruin. They return 
to pervade (tong 通) into one. Only one who is 
truly intelligent understands how they pervade 
(tong 通) into one.37 
 
 
36 McConochie does not explicitly say that it is this specific description that 
gives the idea that dao is all-encompassing. What he does say is that the entire 
anecdote itself is what gives the idea. See: McConochie, “Mysticism in the 
Zhuangzi,” 260. 
37 McConochie, “Mysticism in the Zhuangzi,” 276. 




Here, dao is explicitly described as pervading (tong 通) 
things and making them into one (weiyi 為一). How this 
specifically occurs can be explained by another Zhuangzian 
scholar, Harold Roth: 
[T]he Way [i.e., dao] pervades everything and in 
pervading them unifies them. They are unified to 
the extent that each and every thing contains the 
Way within it; and they are unified in that, from 
the perspective of the Way within, each thing is 
seen to be equal. Because they attain this Way, 
sages can have the same perspective.38 
From what has been said above, it seems safe to assume 
that for Zhuangzi, dao is the ultimate reality that is both 
transcendent and immanent in relation to the world. Dao is 
transcendent in that it existed before the world and 
generates it, while of itself it is not generated and is 
dependent on nothing. Being dependent on nothing, dao is 
unconditioned by the structures and dynamics that 
constitute the rest of beings, such as space and time. 
However, dao is also immanent in the world, because it 
pervades things. Furthermore, it is implied through 
Zhuangzi’s descriptions that dao is the normative order of 
the cosmos. It is that force which moves things into 
 
38 Harold Roth, “Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun,’” in Hiding 
the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 43, n.61. 




becoming “what they are meant to be;” it is dao that sets the 
heavenly bodies on their proper course, and it is also dao 
that bears up the earth. Dao is also the normative order for 
human beings in the sense that the human agents who 
attained dao became “what they were supposed to be” 
according to history. This idea that dao is the normative or 
moral order that humans should follow can, perhaps, be 
further made explicit when discussing the first part of the 
definition of mysticism, and how it can be found in 
Zhuangzi’s writings. 
Again, this first part of the definition of mysticism 
consists of the statement “the quest for direct experience (of 
God, Being, or Ultimate Reality).” According to scholars of 
Zhuangzi’s writings such as the aforementioned Harold 
Roth, Thomas McConochie, and also Livia Kohn, there 
indeed are such indications of this quest.39 To be specific, 
there are places in Zhuangzi’s writings that appear to portray 
ascetic practices that are a means of inducing union with 
dao. Roth collectively calls these practices the “apophatic 
method.”40 According to Roth, “apophasis” or “apophatic” 
is traditionally “associated with a particular mode of 
approach to the nature of God in the writings of Christian 
mystics, the so-called via negativa, in which God is described 
 
39 McConochie, “Mysticism in the Zhuangzi,”228–229; 286–298. 
40 Harold Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Foundations of 
Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 228. 




using negative language.”41 However, Roth’s own usage of 
“apophatic” or “apophasis” means “a method of negating 
the self in order to facilitate an experience of the Absolute, 
however conceived.”42 This method involves “a systematic 
process of negating, forgetting, or emptying out the contents 
of consciousness (perceptions, emotions, desires, thoughts) 
found in ordinary experience based in the ego-self.”43 For 
the mystic, the point of this negation is, precisely, to 
experience the ultimate reality in an unmediated  way.  
Now, Roth implies that this apophatic method appears to 
be a common characteristic of mysticism through the 
different religious traditions of the world. This is 
corroborated by another scholar of mysticism, Robert 
Forman, who coins the term “Forgetting Model” to describe 
a common practice among mystics of different religious 
traditions. This appears similar to the apophatic method.44 As 
its name implies, this forgetting model entails the “forgetting” 
or removal from one’s consciousness all of its usual contents, 
such as “every thought, sensation, emotion.”45 Forman claims 
that such a model can be inferred from the writings of 
mystics in the different religious traditions. To support this,  
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he examines the writings of Meister Eckhart, the author of 
The Cloud of Unknowing, and Buddhaghosa.46 The author of 
The Cloud of Unknowing for instance says: 
[L]ook thou forsake, with a strong and a sly 
[subtle] and a listy contrition, both thy bodily 
wits (as hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, and 
touching), and also thy ghostly wits, the which be 
called thine understandable workings, and all 
those things the which may be known with any 
of thy five bodily wits without-forth; and all 
those things the which may be known by thy 
ghostly wits within-forth; and all those things 
that be now, or yet have been, though they be 
not now; and all those things that be not now, or 
yet may in time for to come, though they be not 
now. . . . [T]hrough the overpassing of thyself 
and all other things, and thus making thyself 
clean from all worldly, fleshly, and natural liking 
in thine affection, and from all things that may 
be known by the proper form in thy knowing, 
thou shall be drawn up above mind in affection 
to the sovereign-substantial beam of the godly 
darkness, all things thus done away.47 
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The author of The Cloud urges his reader to first cease giving 
attention to the five senses and to the sensory data that is 
perceived through them. He then admonishes him to 
forsake even those “ghostly wits,” which, as implied by 
Forman, means those mental faculties that produce mental 
content independent of the five senses, such as the 
imagination, understanding, and memory.48 This, of course, 
also means abandoning the aforesaid mental content that 
these ghostly wits create. It is only by turning away from 
these sense and mental faculties, and by also abjuring the 
content that they produce, that the human souls can be 
brought up to experience the Divine.  
Meister Eckhart similarly says in his sermons that only 
when the human soul forgets its usual mental and sensual 
experiences, and the functioning of its mental and sense 
faculties, can the Divine Word be spoken within it and 
actively work through it.49 
They must know that the very best and noblest 
attainment in this life is to be silent and let God 
work and speak within. When the powers [i.e. 
the mental and sense faculties] have been 
completely withdrawn from all their works and 
images, then the Word is spoken. . . . And so, the  
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more completely you are able to draw in your  
powers to a unity and forget all those things and 
their images which you have absorbed, and the 
further you can get from creatures and their 
images, the nearer you are to this and the readier 
to receive it. . . .In this case [i.e., in such a state] 
the spirit had so entirely absorbed the powers 
that it had forgotten the body: memory no 
longer functioned, nor understanding, nor the 
senses.50 
Although not mentioned by Forman, mystical practices in 
Hinduism also appear to corroborate the apophatic or 
“forgetting model.” In the Yoga Sutras, for instance, 
Patanjali describes the “eight limbs” or steps of yoga that 
lead to union with the Atman or Supreme Self: 
The eight limbs of yoga are: the various forms of 
abstention from evil-doing (yama), the various 
observances (niyamas), posture (asana), control 
of the prana [breath] (pranayama), withdrawal of 
the mind from sense objects (pratyahara), 
concentration (dharana), meditation (dhyana), 
and absorption in the Atman (samadhi).51 
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The fifth step, pratyahara, involves purifying the mind from 
attachments to all sensible and mental content, so that it 
may concentrate—the sixth step, dharana—on only one 
mental object, for example, the image of the god Isvara.52 
This image, in turn, serves as a means to guide the mind into 
unity with the ultimate reality.  
Once the mind achieves a singular focus on this one 
mental image—no longer interrupted by any disturbances or 
any desire to focus on other objects—it then reaches the 
level of meditation, or dhyana. The last stage, samadhi, is 
when the true Self, namely, the Atman or Purusa, reveals 
itself to the meditator. This can be regarded as the 
meditator’s direct experience with ultimate reality. Samadhi, 
however, is of two types: that with support, and that without 
support.53 In samadhi, with support, the meditator becomes 
aware of the ultimate reality, through becoming one with the 
mental image that represents such a reality as, for example, 
the aforesaid god Isvara. In such a state, the meditator is still 
aware of the duality between his own consciousness and its 
object.  However, in Samadhi, without support, this duality is 
ultimately transcended; there is no longer any “object” to 
focus and meditate upon, since the meditator becomes 
wholly absorbed in the ultimate reality, and becomes one 
 
52 Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, 2nd ed., trans. Willard R. Trask 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 73–76. 
53 Eliade, Yoga, 73–76 




with it.54 Mircea Eliade describes the consciousness of the 
meditator in this state as an “entasis of total emptiness,  
without sensory content or intellectual structure.”55 However, 
this does not mean that the consciousness is absolutely 
empty, but rather, it is only empty of objects or specific 
determinations of being. Such determinations of being can 
no longer exist in the meditator’s consciousness, precisely 
because he has become one with pure being itself.56 
Now, in Zhuangzi’s writings, there do appear portrayals 
of practices that can be categorized under the Forgetting 
Model. Indeed, these practices are what Roth similarly 
considers as examples of the Apophatic Method in 
Zhuangzi’s work. One example is the story between 
Confucius and Yan Hui about fasting the heart-mind, found 
in the fourth chapter of the Zhuangzi. In this story, Hui says 
that he plans to go to the state of Wei and be of service to 
its abusive ruler, with the hope of reforming the latter. 
Confucius is skeptical of Hui’s chances of success despite 
the elaborate schemes that the latter proposes. Confucius 
then tells Hui to fast his heart-mind. He says: 
Unify your intention [zhi 志]! It is better to listen 
with your heart/mind than to listen with your 
ears, but better still to listen with your qi than to  
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listen with your heart/mind. Listening stops with 
the ears and the heart/mind stops with matching 
things up [fu 符] but qi is tenuous [xu 虚] and  
waits upon things. Only the Way [i.e., dao] will 
gather in tenuousness . . . Tenuousness is the 
fasting of the heart/mind.57 
After precisely fasting his heart-mind, Hui says that “Before 
I find what moves me into activity, it is myself that is full 
and real. But as soon as I find what moves me, it turns out 
that ‘myself’ has never begun to exist.” 58 Confucius then 
congratulates Hui and the latter is arguably able to fulfill his 
mission successfully.  
According to Edward Slingerland, in the story above, the 
heart-mind is metaphorically depicted as a stomach, the 
contents of which must be fasted away, so that only qi 
remains.59 Qi, because it is empty (qi originally meant vapour 
or air)60 or tenuous, allows “room” for the dao to gather in 
the heart-mind. In other words, the sense and mental 
faculties, along with the data that they store, should be put 
aside to allow direct experience with the ultimate reality that 
is dao. This process of fasting the heart-mind fits with  
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Roth’s understanding of the Apophatic Method. Indeed, if  
one compares the process of fasting the heart-mind with the 
process of forsaking the bodily and ghostly wits found in the 
Cloud of Unknowing, one can see that both processes appear 
to have similar structures.  
In the Cloud of Unknowing one must forsake one’s “bodily 
wits,” meaning the five senses, and then one’s “ghostly 
wits,” meaning the other mental faculties that produce 
mental content without being dependent on the senses, such 
as one’s understanding.  This in turn also seems to be the 
case with the fasting of the heart-mind. Hui is first urged not 
to listen with his ears, which implies abnegating the sense 
faculties and the sense data in his consciousness. Then he is 
urged not to listen even with his heart-mind, which implies 
abnegating the non-sensory mental faculties, as well as the 
non-sensory content of his consciousness. Instead, Hui 
should listen using his qi leading to the heart-mind 
becoming empty, similar to how a stomach is such when 
having fasted. It is in the emptiness, then, of the heart-mind 
that dao can gather. Dao, gathering within Hui’s heart-mind, 
apparently leads to mystical union with dao, which entails 
direct experience of it, as is corroborated by Hui’s 
realization that he has never begun to exist. In other words, 
Hui has lost his sense of self because of experiencing his 
oneness with dao (and arguably the oneness of all things by 
virtue of dao being immanent in all). 




Another example of the apophatic method that Roth says 
can be found in Zhuangzi’s writings is the story of “sitting 
and forgetting,” which appears to be a supplementary 
account of the abovementioned story of the fasting of the 
heart-mind. Like the story of the heart-mind fasting, this 
anecdote is a dialogue between Confucius and Yan Hui, 
where the latter is shown as removing the contents of his 
mind, or consciousness. However, the “sitting and 
forgetting” anecdote illustrates a more detailed account of 
this removing process. It goes as follows: 
Yan Hui said, ‘I am making progress.’ Zhongni 
[i.e., Confucius] replied, ‘What do you mean?’ ‘I 
have ceased to think of benevolence and 
righteousness,’ was the reply. ‘Very well; but that 
is not enough.’ Another day, Hui again saw 
Zhongni, and said, ‘I am making progress.’ ‘What 
do you mean?’ ‘I have lost all thought of 
ceremonies [i.e., ritual/li 禮] and music.’ ‘Very 
well, but that is not enough.’ A third day, Hui 
again saw (the Master), and said, ‘I am making 
progress.’ ‘What do you mean?’ ‘I sit and forget 
everything.’ Zhongni changed countenance, and 
said, ‘What do you mean by saying that you sit 
and forget (everything)?’ Yan Hui replied, ‘My 
connexion [sic] with the body and its parts is 
dissolved; my perceptive organs are discarded. 
Thus leaving my material form, and bidding 




farewell to my knowledge, I am [sic] become one 
with the Great Pervader. This I call sitting and 
forgetting all things.’ Zhongni said, ‘One (with 
that Pervader), you are free from all likings; so 
transformed, you are [sic] become impermanent. 
You have, indeed, become superior to me! I 
must ask leave to follow in your steps.’61 
Here, Yan Hui is shown to gradually remove from his mind 
(or heart-mind) the various mental contents that he, as a 
follower of Confucius, is expected to retain in his 
consciousness such as, precisely, benevolence and 
righteousness, as well as rituals and music.62 However, he 
goes beyond this, and even “forgets” his own body along 
with its senses. This process culminates in him attaining 
unity with the “Great Pervader (datong大通),” which is most 
likely dao—as shown above, dao pervades (tong 通 ) all 
things. 
A final example of what is arguably an instance of the 
apophatic method in Zhuangzi’s writings—although Roth 
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does not consider it as such—is the story of Cook Ding and 
his cutting of the ox. This story is found in chapter three of 
the Zhuangzi, titled “The Primacy of Nourishing of Life.” In 
this story, Ding is a butcher in the service of King Hui. The 
latter saw him practicing his trade and was astonished at the 
skill that he showed. Ding is described as follows:  
Wherever his hand smacked it, wherever his 
shoulder leaned into it, wherever his foot braced 
it, wherever his knee pressed it, the thwacking 
tones of flesh falling from bone would echo, the 
knife would whiz through with its resonant 
thwing, each stroke ringing out the perfect note, 
attuned to the “Dance of the Mulberry Grove” 
or the “Jingshou Chorus”. . .63 
King Hui then asks Ding how his skill could reach such 
heights.64 Ding answers that what he cares for is dao which 
is “beyond mere skill.”65 He further says: 
When I first started cutting up oxen, all I 
looked at for three years was oxen, and yet still 
I was unable to see all there was to see in an ox. 
But now I encounter it with the spirit [i.e., shen
神] rather than scrutinizing it with the eyes. My  
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understanding consciousness, beholden to its 
specific purpose, comes to a halt, and thus the  
promptings of the spirit begin to flow. I 
depend on Heaven’s unwrought perforations 
[i.e., tianli 天理 ] and strike the larger gaps, 
following along with the broader hollows. I go 
by how they already are, playing them as they 
lay. So my knife has never had to cut through 
the knotted nodes where the warp hits the 
weave, much less the gnarled joints of bone. A 
good cook changes his blade once a year: he 
slices. An ordinary cook changes his blade once 
a month: he hacks. I have been using this same 
blade for nineteen years, cutting up thousands 
of oxen, and yet it is still as sharp as the day it 
came off the whetstone.66 
Now, Ding’s account is reminiscent of the apophatic method, 
because it involves the setting aside of one’s sense and mental 
faculties. Specifically, Ding has to let go of trusting his eyes, 
and eventually, even his understanding consciousness. Only 
then was he able to cut the ox perfectly, according to its 
natural patterns or Heaven’s “unwrought perforations.” In 
other words, what Ding arguably recounts is ultimately the 
process of attaining union with dao, which Ding says is what 
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he cares for and which he hints is that which is truly behind 
his ability to perfectly chop oxen (instead of skill).  
From all that has been discussed, then, it seems that 
Zhuangzi does write of attempts or “quests” to directly 
experience dao or ultimate reality.67 Consequently, it can be 
concluded that Zhuangzi’s writings include elements of 
mysticism. Indeed, it seems that, for Zhuangzi, an ideal 
human state is precisely achieving mystical union with dao. 
How though does understanding Zhuangzi’s mysticism lead 
to the conclusion that his metaethical view is more plausibly 
moral realism than moral relativism? 
Zhuangzi’s Mystical Moral Realism 
To defend the idea that Zhuangzi holds a moral realist 
metaethical view, it would be good to have a definition of 
moral realism, first. Moral realism can be described as the 
idea that “moral properties and/or facts exist and are in 
some way independent from people’s judgments.”68 To be 
more precise, I shall borrow from Kevin DeLapp’s 
definition of moral realism since I think it squares more with 
what Zhuangzi’s writings implies. This definition states that 
moral realism is “The view that moral values exist in a way 
that is causally and evidentially . . . independent from beliefs 
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of anyone and everyone . . . such that evidence and beliefs 
do not determine or constitute those values, though they 
may adequately and reliably measure or reflect them.”69 That 
moral value is causally independent means that “if moral 
values are ever known, it is through a kind of ‘discovery’ 
about something that already exists, rather than an invention of 
something new.”70 Similarly, that moral value is evidentially 
independent means that such values “are distinct from our 
standards of discovery and justification, that is, the standards 
or process of justification may be invented by us, but the 
objects of the discovery are not.”71 
Is there any notion in Zhuangzi’s writings that moral 
values exist independently of any person’s beliefs? I believe 
there is, and it lies in the idea that dao itself is not only the 
ontological ground, but also the normative ground of the 
universe. Again, this can be seen in the description of dao 
mentioned above: things receive dao and in doing so 
become what they are supposed to be. To reiterate, the 
celestial bodies, once having received dao, become 
unswerving in following their appointed course in the 
heavens. The historic personages, such as Pengzu, after 
receiving dao, become what they were known to have been. 
Xuyou’s above mentioned reference to dao as his “teacher” 
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likewise suggests that dao is a normative principle that can 
serve as a guide to people. This is especially plausible 
considering that Xuyou considers his teacher superior to the 
ancient sage-kings, who in turn are the moral exemplars of 
the Confucians. By doing so, Xuyou, and Zhuangzi through 
him, is arguably suggesting that dao can serve as a better 
moral guide than Confucianism. The story of Cook Ding 
also implies that dao is a normative guide. It is Cook Ding’s 
care for dao that allows him to cut the ox in the most 
optimal manner. In other words, it is not by trusting his 
senses, his understanding, or even his “skill,” that Ding is 
able to act in the best way (or the most normative way) in 
the situation given to him. Rather, he is able to do this by 
precisely abnegating these things and attaining dao. 
However, I believe that it is the story of Yan Hui’s heart-
mind fasting where the notion of dao as the ideal normative 
guide can be better seen. Again, in that story, Hui initially 
plans to reform the King of Wei. To convince his Master 
Confucius that his plan will work, Hui gives a number of 
strategies such as becoming “punctilious in bearing,” 
becoming “unified and focused,” and becoming “internally 
upright but externally adaptable.”72 Despite sounding ingenious 
and fool proof, these strategies prove inadequate for 
Confucius, who still thinks that Hui is taking his heart-mind 
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as his instructor.73 But what is interesting is that the advice 
that Confucius gives is not simply another “better”  
strategy, or at least not in the same spirit as those of Hui’s. 
Rather, he tells Hui to engage in the apophatic method 
aimed to achieve union with dao. After experiencing this 
union through introvertive mystical experience, and then 
returning to the world in an arguably mystically enlightened 
state, Hui then is able to execute his mission in the proper 
manner. This story (and even that of Cook Ding’s) shows 
then that it is only by achieving union with dao, and not 
relying on the ability of one’s heart-mind to produce 
schemes and principles, that one is able to discover the best 
action to take. Or, to say it alternatively, it is only by being 
mystically united with the normative order of the world that 
one is able to precisely act in accord with it. 
Zhuangzi’s description of the ideal person, namely, the 
“Genuine Human Being,” also corroborates the idea that 
dao, instead of the heart-mind, is the ideal normative 
principle to follow.  The description says that the Genuine 
Human Beings: 
did not plan their affairs in advance. In this way, 
they could be wrong or they could be right, but 
without regret and without self-satisfaction. . . . 
The Genuine Human Being understood nothing 
about delighting in being alive or hating death. 
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They emerged without delight, submerged again 
without resistance. . . . This is what it means not 
to use the mind [i.e., heart-mind] to push away 
the Course [i.e., dao], not to use the Human to 
try to help the Heavenly. Such is what I’d call 
being a Genuine Human Being.74 
In this passage, the Genuine Human Being is said not to 
plan his affairs in advance. This indicates that the Genuine 
Human Being does not rely on his heart-mind and its 
capacity to scheme or strategize (which is precisely Yan 
Hui’s fault in the story of the fasting of the heart-mind).  
The Genuine Human Being is also portrayed as being 
unaffected by the normal things that cause people joy or 
aversion, such as being alive and dead, respectively. This 
suggests that the Genuine Human Being no longer takes the 
heart-mind into serious consideration because it is arguably 
this heart-mind, and its conventional understanding of 
things, that is the source of the aforesaid joys and aversions. 
Indeed, it can be surmised that because dao makes all things 
one by pervading them, then the person who becomes one 
with dao through the apophatic method, also becomes one 
with all things. Consequently, the experiences of living and 
dying lose their significance for that person since, being one  
with all things, such experiences are neither a gain nor a loss.  
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Finally, in the penultimate sentence of the above-cited 
passage, Zhuangzhi says explicitly that the normative guide, 
which the Genuine Human Being adheres to, is precisely 
dao, instead of the heart-mind. 
Taking all of this into consideration, it can indeed be said 
that Zhuangzi promotes a kind of moral realism since, for 
him, the ground of normativity or morality is the same 
ground for the existence of all things, namely, the ultimate 
reality that is dao. Needless to say, dao as ultimate reality is 
causally and evidentially independent from the beliefs of any 
person. Although people might “discover” dao through 
practicing the mystical apophatic method, people themselves 
in no way invent it. Indeed, it is arguably the other way 
around, that is, it is dao which generates people and all 
things. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have argued for the viability of a moral 
realist reading of Zhuangzi’s metaethical view. I have initially 
shown that the dominant moral relativist interpretations of 
Zhuangzi’s work still runs into interpretive difficulties, 
because in his writings, Zhuangzi expresses strong evaluative 
statements that do not appear to square with moral 
relativism. On the contrary, these statements seem to 
suggest that Zhuangzi preferred a certain form or way of life 
over others. This way of life in turn appears to be the 
mystical way of life, or in other words, the way of life geared 




towards attaining direct experience of ultimate reality. By 
exploring Zhuangzi’s mysticism, I have shown that 
Zhuangzi does believe that there is an objective source of 
morality, which is independent from anyone’s beliefs. This 
source is dao itself, which is the ontological ground and 
normative order of the universe, and the ultimate reality of 
Zhuangzi’s mysticism. Zhuangzi does not believe that all 
ways of life, or all daos, are equally good or legitimate. 
Rather, it appears that for him it is the way of life that is 
mystically attuned to dao, understood as the ultimate reality, 





Berthrong, John. “Xin (Hsin): Heart and Mind.” In Encyclopedia of 
Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2003. 
Cheng, Chun-ying. “Qi (Ch’i): Vital Force.” In Encyclopedia of Chinese 
Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. Abingdon: Routledge, 
2003. 
Confucius. Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. 
Translated by Edward Slingerland. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company Inc., 2003. 
DeLapp, Kevin. Moral Realism (Bloomsbury Ethics). London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 




Eliade, Mircea. Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. 2nd ed., Translated by 
Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
Fisher, Andrew. Metaethics: An Introduction. Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014. 
Forman, Robert K.C. The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and 
Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Hansen, Chad. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical 
Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
———.“Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi.” 
In Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, 
edited by Scott Cook, 128–62. New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2003. 
Jones, Richard H. Philosophy of Mysticism: Raids on the Ineffable. New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2016. 
Katz, Steven T., ed. Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original 
Sources. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Kim, Chin-Tai.“Transcendence and Immanence.” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 55, no. 3 (Autumn 1987): 537–49. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1464069 (accessed September 10, 
2017). 
Kreger, Wayne Gary. “The Experience of Knowing: Illusion and 
Illumination in the Zhuangzi and the Platform Sutra.” Master’s 
Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2010. 
Lee, Jung H. The Ethical Foundation of Early Daoism: Zhuangzi’s Unique 
Moral Vision. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
McConochie, Thomas John. “Mysticism in the Zhuangzi.” PhD 
Diss., University of New South Wales, 2017. 




Meister Eckhart. The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart. 
Translated by Maurice O’C Walshe. New York: The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 2010. 
Møllgaard, Eske. An Introduction to Daoist Thought: Action, Language, 
and Ethics in Zhuangzi. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. 
Olberding, Amy. “Introduction.” In Dao Companion to the Analects, 
edited by Amy Olberding, 1–17. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. 
Patanjali. How to Know God :The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali. Translated 
by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood. 
Hollywood, CA: Vedanta Press, 1953. 
Roth, Harold. “Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun.’” In 
Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, 
edited by Scott Cook, 15–32. New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2003.  
———. Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Foundations of 
Taoist Mysticism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
Sarkissian, Hagop. “Ritual and Rightness in the Analects.” In Dao 
Companion to the Analects, edited by Amy Olberding, 95–116. 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. 
Slingerland, Edward. Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor 
and Spiritual Ideal in Early China. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Treatises. Translated by Justin 
McCann. Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1952. 
Wildman, Wesley. “Really Ultimate Reality.” Theology and Science 
15, no. 3, (2017): 260–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
14746700.2017.1335061 (accessed November 25, 2017). 
Yu-Lan, Fung. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, New York: The 
Free Press, 1997. 




Zhuangzi. Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters.  1981.Translated by Angus 
Charles Graham. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2001. 
———. “The Great and Most Honoured Master.” Translated by 
James Legge. Chinese Text Project. Site edited and maintained 
by Donald Sturgeon. http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/great-and-
most-honoured-master. (accessed June 15, 2017). 
———. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional 
Commentaries. Translated by Brook Ziporyn. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2009. 
 
 
